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THE KOWSHING, IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW.
In entering upon a discussion of this case the author of this
thesis is not unaware of the presumption, arising out of his
Japanese nationality, that his presentation of the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case may be lacking in impartiality. It is in
view of this presumption that in the following statement of the
case the author expressly refrains from making a single refer-
ence to the Japanese sources. From the reports' of the Captain
and the chief officer of the Kowslzing the following facts appear:
Nationality.-The Kowslzing was a British steamer belonging
to the Indo-Chinese Steam Navigation Co., an English corpora-
tion doing business in China.
Employment.-She was chartered by the Chinese Government
to serve as a transport, and formed a part of the expedition of
ten transports which carried troops from China to Korea. At
the time she was sunk by the Naniwa, a Japanese man-of-war,
she was actually engaged in carrying i, ioo Chinese soldiers, two
Chinese generals, one European military director, a number of
other officers, twelve guns, and rifles and ammunition proportion-
ate to the number of soldiers.
Time and Place.-She was sighted by the Nanziwa at about 9
A. ..i. on the 25th day of July, 1894, off the coast of Korea, and
at about 2 P. M. she was finally sunk.
Circumstances.-The fact that the Kowshing was a British
steamer was several times repeated to the Japanese, as was also
the fact that at the time of her leaving port war had not been
declared. In consequence of these remonstrances the Naniwa
made many efforts to make the Kowslhing follow her without the
use of force. Failing in these peaceable efforts the Naniwa dis-
charged a torpedo and also fired her guns, resulting in the sink-
ing of the vessel.
The claim, made by the officers of the Kowshing, that at the
time of her leaving port war had not been declared, was un-
doubtedly well-founded, but, at the same time, the important
fact must not be lost sight of, that a state of war was actually
existing at the time she was sighted. Witness the following
I Appendix A, Nos. i and 2.
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extracts from Vladimir's "China-Japan War": "On the 25th
[July, 1894] at 7 A. m., when they [three Japanese men-of-war]
were near the islands of Phung and Shapain, they met two
Chinese men-of-war-the Tsi-yuen and the Kwang-yi. * * *
The action was short and decisive. In about an hour the
Kwang-yi was crippled, "and had to be run into shallow water.
The Tsi-yuen had her bow gun disabled, twenty of the .crew
were killed, etc., etc." Thus it appears that only a few hours
before the IXowshing was sighted an actual war had broken out.
The first question, then, of international law is: Did Japan act
within the rules of internatiof'al law in commencing a war with-
out a formal declaration?
Roman Practice.-It is often asserted that the Romans never
commenced a war without making a formal declaration, but no
less a man than Lord Hale is the authority for saying that even
with them the 6eremony was frequently dispensed with, when,
e. g., delay might occasion surprisal or irreparable damage to
the Commonwealth; as when the adverse party made prepara-
tion, which if not suddenly repressed, might prove more danger-
ous and irresistible. Commenting upon this Robert Ward, the
historian of international law, says: "The soundness of this
opinion depends upon no deep founded reasoning, no abstract
propositions, no ingenious niceties. It is graven in the common
sense, in the very instincts of mankind. For who, having proof
that'another had resolved to attack him in arms, and seeing him
approach with arms in his hands, would not instantly disable
him if he could, before his design was executed? Who that is
told that another is seeking a sword to aim at his breast, will not
be beforehand if he can, and seize the sword himself? In civil
society, where threats of violence are used by an enemy, we
have a right to demand security, and the judge must award it.
Out of society there is no judge, and the man of nature is left to
discretion. It is needless to remark that States, in this respect,
are out of society."'
Modern Practice.-It will not be denied that it lies at the
very conception of international law that it is a body of rules
and practices set up by the civilized nations of the world,
of their own free will and accord. What, then, has been
the practice of modern civilized nations regarding this point?
2 Vladimir is an Englishman who was connected with a diplomatic mission
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Woolsey says that "the number of wars without declaration
within the last three centuries is quite considerable," and, by
way of illustration, mentions the war of Spain with the United
Provinces, and that of Gustavus Adolphus with the Emperor
Ferdinand II., as having been waged without being preceded by
any formal declaration. Kent gives the following as instances
in which no declaration preceded, viz.: i. The war of 1756,
between England and France; 2. The war of 1778, between
England and France; 3. The war of 1793 between England and
France; 4. The war of 1803, between England and France; 5.
The war of 1812, between United States and England. Nor do
the foregoing exhaust the list. Louis XIV. commenced the war
of 1688 without making any formal declaration, and it was after
he had marched to the Rhine, invested all, captured some, of the
fortresses of the Palatine, that he published his manifesto of
war. The war of the Spanish Succession was carried on for
many months without any declaration. The bloody battle of
Chiari, September i, 1701, was fought nine months before declar-
ation on one side and nearly a year on the other. The entire
destruction by the English of the Spanish fleet at Passaro, August
ii, 1718, took place without any formal declaration and was jus-
tified by England on the ground that the delay necessarily
caused by such declaration would have enabled Spain to destroy
the ally whom the English fleet was sent to protect. The war
between France and Mexico in 1838 was begun by France insti-
tuting a blockade which Mexico considered an act of hostility.
The war between the United States and Mexico in 1846 was
begun without either notice or manifesto. These examples,
which by no means exhaust the list, are sufficient to show that
the uniform practice of modern nations has been to disregard the
ancient custom of making a formal declaration before commenc-
ing hostilities. The explanation of this disuse is to be found, as
suggested by Woolsey, in "the publicity and circulation of intel-
ligence peculiar to modern times."
Authorities.-Passing from single instances of practice to con-
clusions reached by the writers on International law, it is found
that there is a substantial agreement amongst them that a previ-
ous declaration is not necessary. Woolsey holds that war be-
tween independent sovereignties ought to be an avowed open
way of obtaining justice, and reasons thus: "For every state
has a right to know what its relations are towards those with
whom it has been on terms of amity, etc., etc. It is necessary,
therefore, that scme act show in a way not to be mistaken that
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a new state of things, a state of war, has begun. "' It is evident
from this reasoning of this great American publicist that the ex-
pression "an avowed open way" is here intended to have a
broad meaning, including not only a formal declaration but also
any communication that notifies the other state, in terms not to
be misunderstood, that the amicable relation hitherto existing is
at an end.
Phillimore goes farther than this. Shortly stated, his posi-
tion is that it is sufficient if one state lets the other understand
its belligerent intentions, no matter in what form it is done.
Witness the following passage: "For what does the reason of
the thing require as a preliminary to actual war? Not that the
party compelled to seek redress should afford his enemy, the
wrong-doer, an opportunity of strengthening himself in his in-
justice, and even taking the other supposition, that both parties
conceived themselves to be fully in the right, no analogy of
private jurisprudence suggests that the one party should con-
cede to the other any advantage in the law suit, whether it be
that of evading the tribunal or of mending his case; the truth is,
that good faith and the general interest of the Society of States
require that when one member of it is about to exchange friendly
for belligerent relations with another, he should not do so until
fair and reasonable notice of his relations has been communi-
cated. The channel of communication is, after all, of little
importance, whether it be through a demand accompanied by a
direct intimation that upon its refusal recourse would be had to
war; or whether that intimation may be indirectly suggested by
the nature of the demand itself, and the surrounding circum-
stances of the case, among which circumstances considerable
weight must be ascribed to the withdrawal of the ambassador.' "
Bynkershoek, who devotes a whole chapter to the subject of
Declaration,is conceded to be by far the greatest authority on the
subject. It is, therefore, interesting to see that he holds that
declaration is unnecessary; that a war may begin by mutual
hostilities as well as by a declaration; that it is evident, that
where there is no judge between the parties, as is the case with
princes, everyone may retake that which belongs to him; that
this being the case, everyone is at liberty to make or not, as he
pleases, a declaration of war; that reason alone is the soul of the
law of nations, and that taking reason for guide no argument
can be found to prove the necessity of declaration, but many on
4 Woolsey's "Introduction."
6 Philimore's International Law, Vol. III.
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the contrary, to show that it is not necessary (Bynkershoek's
Treatise on the Law of War, Chapter II.).
Lord Hale, the expositor of the Public Law of England,
states that, according to that law, "A general war is of two
kinds: i. Bellum solemnitur denuntiatum; or 2, Bellum non
solemnitur denuntiatum; the former sort of war is, when war is
solemnly declared or proclaimed by one King against another
Prince or state, etc., etc. * * * A war that is non solemnitur
denuntiatum is, when two nations slip. suddenly into a war
without any solemnity, and this ordinarily happeneth among
us; the Dutch war was a real war, and yet it began barely upon
general letters of marque; again, if a foreign Prince invades our
coasts or sets upon the King's navy at sea, hereupon a real, tho'
not a solemn war may and hath formerly arisen, and therefore
to prove a nation to be in enmity to England, or to prove a per-
son to be an alien enemy, there is no necessity of showing any
war proclaimed, but it may be averred, and so put upon trial by
the country, whether there was a war or not, etc., etc.'
Hall, the English lawyer and publicist, whose recent death
was lamented as a great loss to England and to the world, in his
work on International Law takes the position that any sort of
previous declaration is an empty formality unless an enemy
must be given time and opportunity to put himself in a state of
defense, conceding, of course, that no one has yet asserted such
quixotism to be obligatory. After reviewing many authorities
and precedents he concludes, that, when possible, some notice
ought to be issued, for the convenience of neutrals, before com-
mencing hostilities; that this cannot always be insisted upon
inasmuch as there are cases when action, for example, on condi-
tional orders to a general or admiral, takes place under such cir-
cumstances that a manifesto cannot be previously published
(Hall, 315-322).
Vattel is often cited as an authority for insisting on Declara-
tion before hostility, but even he, in so many words, says, that
where delay would give the enemy time to prepare for defense,
declaration may be dispensed with; that before declaration the
enemy's frontiers may be reached, nay, his territory be entered
and even his advantageous stations be occupied. Witness the
following: "The law of nations does not impose the obligation
of declaring war, for giving the enemy time to prepare itself for
an unjust defense. The declaration need not be made till the
army has reached the frontiers; it is even lawful to delay it till
6 Hale's Pleas of the Crown.
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we have entered the enemy's territory, and occupied an advan-
tageous station; yet it must always precede the commission of
any hostility.' "
It is probable that the last clause above cited is construed to
mean that a formal declaration must always precede war. But
one who reads that clause with any degree of care can not fail
to discover that it means no more than this-that even at that
moment when you have occupied the enemy's advantageous
positions and are ready to charge upon him, you must not forget
what you are about; that even at that moment, if the enemy is
willing to comply with your demands, you must refrain from
fighting him; that to this end you must precede your hostile
acts with a formal declaration, for you cannot tell but that that
last moment may awaken your enemy to his sense. But if it
does not, then you may charge upon him at once. Thus Vat-
tel's position is defeated by his own reasoning; for what is the
use of a declaration if you can be fighting your enemy at the
same instant with it? Moreover, is it not always understood
that the invading state must stop as soon as the offending state
submits? The practical result of Vattel's reasoning also is that
war may be waged without being preceded by a formal declara-
tion.
But it is from Hugo Grotius that Vattel, Puffendorf and the
rest who insist on Formal Declaration derive their authority.
Hence it is that we must look to him for the true reason of what
he and his disciples contend for. "The true reason is," says
Grotius, "that the war might appear for certain to be the act of
the people, or the rulers of the people, since there are peculiar
rights of war, which have not place in hostilities against robbers,
or revolted subjects." In other words, Grotius calls for un-
doubted evidence that the war proceeds from a sovereign power.
That this condition is met when one government publishes a
declaration against another, is not denied. But this is merely
one mode of proof. There is at least one other mode of proof.
This is when the Foreign Minister of one court and the Ambas-
sador of another carry on a series of negotiations, which is finally
brought to an unsatisfactory termination. That such was the
case with the relations between Japan and China will be seen by
referring to the nine official documents published by the Japan-
ese Government.' Before concluding this review of the authori-
ties, another reference may be made to the eminent English
Vatters International Law.8 Appendix B.
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author, the historian of International law, to whom reference
has already been made. The following two propositions are laid
down by him as the result of the soundest opinions on the duty
of nations about to assume the character of enemies:
I. When there are differences between states which cannot
be composed, the sword shall not be drawn unless justice has
been demanded and refused, or delayed so as to amount to a
refusal, and unless there is a reasonable understanding between
the parties, of the consequences of such refusal; but
II. The above proposition cannot apply wherever an adversary,
by threatening attitudes and dangerous provisions of hostilities, the
causes of which he will not satisfactorily explain, has rendered the
duties it contains unnecessary.9
The result of the foregoing review of precedents and
authorities may be summarized as follows:
Declaration is a custom which has come down from one or
two nations of antiquity-particularly the Romans. But the
Romans themselves did not observe the custom when the princi-
ple of self-preservation was involved, as, for instance, when the
enemy was getting ready for an attack and the delay caused by
a declaration would have enabled him to do irreparable damage.
The modern nations of Europe, who have adopted many of
the laws and customs of the Romans, and who for a long time
had considered this particular custom of declaration as binding
upon them simply for the reason that it had come from the
Romans with other customs, have at last concluded that this is
a custom altogether too antiquated for these modern times, and
their almost uniform practice for the last two hundred years or
so has been to disregard this custom of making a formal previ-
ous declaration.
All the writers consulted, except one, are agreed that the in-
tention of belligerency must be communicated in some way.
The only point on which they differ or can be'said to differ is the
form that the notice of belligerency should assume. Woolsey
does not say what form it should assume, but rather intimates
that any act is sufficient if its shows unmistakably the intention
of belligerency. Phillimore expressly states that form is imma-
terial. Bynkershoek totally denies the necessity of a declara-
tion. Lord Hale states that the Public law of England recog-
nizes such a thing as a war without declaration. Hall charac-
terizes a declaration as an empty formality. Vattel and Grotius,
while insisting on a previous declaration, reduce their position to
9 Ward's "Essays."
YALE LA W JO URNAL.
a mere nothing, the one by admitting that the ceremony may be
immediately followed by hostilities, the other by saying that it is
for no other purpose than evidence. Ward calls for a reasonable
understanding between the parties as to the consequences of
their disagreement, but he says that this duty is made unneces-
sary if the opposite party is already making warlike prepara-
tions the cause of which he will not explain.
Coming back to the question, "Did Japan act within the rules
of International Law in commencing a war without a formal
declaration?" the Romans would seem to say, "Yes; under some
circumstances we have done so." The modern nations of
Europe would seem to say, "Yes; that has been our uniform
practice for over two hundred years." Bynhershoek, Hale, and
Hall would seem to say, "Yes," absolutely. Vattel would seem
to say, "Yes," in substance. Woolsey, Phillimore and Ward
would seem to say, "Yes," with the proviso that the opposite
party was sufficiently informed as to what the consequences of
disagreement would be. To this Ward would seem to add, "This
proviso, however, does not apply where the opposite party is
already making warlike preparations against you." Grotius
also would seem to say, "Yes," with the proviso that the opposite
party had sufficient evidence that the war proceeded from Sover-
eignty.
The application of these principles to the case in question
requires an examination fuller than that already made into the
relations existing between Japan and China up to, and, at the
time in question-namely, the morning of July 25 th, 1894. It
being the aim of the author that no ex parte account of facts
shall be allowed to get into this thesis, he has elsewhere "
appended the full text of the nine diplomatic documents that
passed between Japan and China immediately preceding the out-
break of the war. As giving light on these documents it may
also be well to recall at this point the provisions of the well-
known Tien-tsin Treaty of 1885. It provided:
i. That the troops of Japan and China then in Korea should
be withdrawn immediately.
2. That no more officers should be sent to Korea for military
instruction by either Japan or China.
3. That if in future any disturbance of a grave nature should
occur in Korea, necessitating the respective countries or either
of them sending troops there, they should give each to the other
previous notice in writing of their intention so to do, and after
10Appendix B.
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the matter is settled they should withdraw their troops and not
further station them there.
It is now proposed to examine the nine diplomatic documents
above referred to.
No. I. is a strangely inconsistent document. With legal
Frecision it states the reason why the notice is sent to Japan-
that it is because by virtue of the Treaty of 1885 Japan and
China stand on precisely the same footing in regard to their
rights in Korea. Towards the close, however, it vaguely hints
that Korea is a tributary state of China, by declaring that the
sending of troops to Korea is in harmony with China's constant
practice to protect her tributary states by sending troops to
assist them. In No. II., dated the same day, Japan makes a
prompt and explicit denial of this vague claim. In No. III.,
also dated the same day, Japan gives notice to China, that if
China avails herself of her rights under the Treaty of i885,
Japan also intends to do the same. In No. IV. China makes
another vague claim that Korea is her tributary state. She also
declares that the sole object of he sending troops to Korea is the
suppression of the Korean insurgents. (The importance of
remembering this point will appear later.) She attempts also to
limit the number of the Japanese troops, and to restrict their
movements, in Korea. In No. V. Japan makes another plain
denial that Korea is a tributary state of China. She declares
also that she will use her own judgment in the exercise of her
legitimate rights.
With No. VI. the correspondence assumes a new phase-
Japan proposes the cotiperation of the two countries, (T) in the
suppression of the Korean insurgents, and (2) in the improve-
ment of the Korean administration. No one who recalls the
series of events that led to the conclusion of the Tientsin Treaty
in 1885, can doubt the reasonableness of this proposal. China
herself does not deny its reasonableness. She takes five days to
find an excuse. At last she sends her reply. In this reply (No.
VII.) she declares that the insurgents have already been sup-
pressed and there is no necessity for the co-operation of the
troops of the two countries in this matter: she rejects Japan's
idea of instituting administrative reforms in Korea; she reminds
Japan that in consequence of the suppression of the insurgents
and by virtue of the binding force of the Tientsin Treaty the
Japanese troops must be withdrawn at once; but she is silent as
to the withdrawal of her own troops from Korea or as to the
binding force of that treaty on herself.
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In No. VIII. Japan disagrees with China, and declares that
she will not withdraw her troops unless she is guaranteed that
the insurgents have been fully suppressed and the cause of
trouble eradicated. This disagreement is virtually the end of
the series of negotiations. Between this document and the next
there is an interval of twenty-three days, during which, it may
be fairly inferred from No. IX., China persistently insists upon
the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Korea but does not
withdraw her own. At last Japan sends the last of all commu-
nication from either side. In No. IX. Japan sets forth the
unsatisfactory outcome of the ,negotiations and concludes that
"the only conclusion deducible from these circumstances is that
the Chinese Government are disposed to precipitate complica-
tions, and in this juncture the Imperial Japanese Government
find themselves relieved of all responsibility for any eventuality
that may, in future, arise out of the situation."
The foregoing examination of these documents shows-that
China admitted that she stood on precisely the same footing with
Japan in regard to her rights in Korea; that it was only in case
a disturbance of a grave nature existed in Korea that she could
send her troops there; that such disturbance did exist; that
therefore she had sent her troops for the sole purpose of sup-
pressing it. That Japan, upon receipt of China's notice, took no
time in despatching her own troops to Korea, unwilling that the
sad event of 1884 should be repeated; that she then proposed
that Japan and China should unite in suppressing the insurgents
and reforming the administration. That China rejected these
proposals, and in so doing represented that the insurgents had
been suppressed and demanded that Japan should withdraw her
troops, at the same time keeping her own troops in Xorea, not-
withstanding her previous declaration that the sole object of the
presence of her troops in Korea was the suppression of the
insurgents. That Japan disagreed with China, refused to
believe China's representation as long as it was contradicted by
the latter's own conduct in not withdrawing the Chinese troops,
and resolutely refused to withdraw her troops. That after this
disagreement China again demanded, and Japan again refused,
the withdrawal of the Japanese troops. That at last Japan gave
notice to China that her conduct in rejecting Japan's proposals,
and in demanding the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, with-
out at the same time withdrawing her own, was such that Japan
did not hesitate to suspect a disposition on the part of China to
precipitate complications, and warned her, as plainly as diplo-
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matic politeness would permit, that any further act in the same
line would be met as an act of belligerency.
It was when matters stood at this stage that hostilities were
-commenced on July 25 th, 1894, one of the incidents of which
was the sinking of the Kowshing. Would not Woolsey, Philli-
more, Ward and even Vattel, unite in saying that China was
sufficiently informed as to what the consequences of despatching
more troops to Korea (and be it always remembered that the
Kowsling was carrying more than i,ioo soldiers to Korea)
would be? Bearing in mind the warning given by Japan's Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, would not Grotius hold that China had
sufficient evidence that the war proceeded from the Sovereign
Power of Japan? Judging from their precedents, would not any
nation of Europe have done the same under similar circum-
stances? Besides, even supposing for the sake of the argument,
that China had no notice of Japan's intention, the Kowshing, with
her cargo of officers, soldiers, and ammunition, would, if allowed
to proceed, have enabled China to reinfore her forces in Korea
to such an extent that she would have had little difficulty in
driving all Japanese out of Korea. Was not this a case to which
the second proposition of Ward applies? that notice need not be
given where the opposite party is already making warlike pre-
parations against you. Under such circumstances would not
even the Romans have dispensed with the ceremony of declara-
tion? China had officially declared that her sole purpose in
sending troops to Korea was to suppress the insurgents. She
had also officially declared that the disturbance no longer ex-
isted. She had also been officially warned that if, under the cir-
cumstances, she sent any more troops, Japan would regard the
act as a belligerent one. Yet she refused to heed the warning.
She sent more troops. She sent them for the unmistakable
purpose of fighting Japan. Under these circumstances it will
not be denied that Japan was acting within the rules of Inter-
national Law in commencing hostilities in advance of a formal
declaration.
But it is asserted that the Kowshing was a neutral vessel, en-
titled to the rights of a neutral, and, therefore, the sinking of
her by the Japanese man-of-war was a gross violation of Intera-
tional law. The following is quoted from the Law Review and
MVagazfine (London) as giving the strongest statement of that
side: "The further question arises as to whether the action of
the Japanese was not, in the absence of any intimation of a state of
hostilities, a gross violation of neutral rights. It is quite clear in
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these days that, as between the contending parties themselves,
no formal declaration of war is necessary. As regards third
parties, however, it is a well supported and altogether reason-
able view that either some sort of clear notice should be given,
in order to throw upon them the duties of neutrality; or at any
rate that there should be proof that the existence of war de facto-
was so public and notorious as to be in fact known to the neutral.
* * * To admit otherwise is to admit the extraordinary princi-
ple that a war between A and B may be legitimately commenced
and declared by a sudden attack on C's property, in which A has
a slight interest. But even 4part from this fundamental viola-
tion of International Law, it was clearly the duty of the Japan-
ese, under any circumstances, to conduct the Kowshing to the
nearest Japanese port for adjudication by a Court of Prize. If
such a taking of the Kowslhing into a Japanese port was rendered
impossible, owing to the opposition of the Chinese troops on
board, the ship should have been captured in the usual way. It
seems absurd to suppose that a fully-equipped man-of-war, with
available consorts to support her, could not have taken pos-
session of an unarmed merchant vessel without summarily blow-
ing her out of the water" (by J. M. Gover, LL.D., editor Depart-
ment International Law).
Thus Mr. Gover maintains that a neutral is entitled to notice
before he can be charged with the duties of a neutral. But, as
his countryman, Hall, says, this rule is at best a rule of con-
venience. Admitting, for the sake of the drgument, that this
rule of convenience applies in all cases, it is submitted that in
the particular case under consideration there was a sufficient
notice in the very nature of the transaction, which, on the part
of the vessel, was nothing less than an undertaking to form a
part of China's hostile expedition against Japan. The Japanese
Commander did not act on "the extraordinary principle that a.
war between A and B may be legitimately commenced by a sud-
den attack on C's property, in which A has a slight interest."
On the contrary, he acted on the very ordinary principle of self-
preservation that in a war between A and B, C must not be per-
mitted to resort to the mean trick of assisting A without divest-
ing himself of his neutral rights. It shocks any ordinary man's
conscience and utterly confounds his common sense to be told
that in a war between A and B, C may come in and materially
assist A against B and, when caught by B in that very act, claim
to be absolved from all responsibility because he had all the while
been flying his neutral flag. It is against this very abuse of neu-
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trality and prostitution of neutral flag that Mr. Gover's own coun-
try has always protested in her wars with other nations. Mr. Gover
thinks that if the opposition of the Chinese troops on board was
such that it was impossible for the Japanese to take the Kowshing
into the nearest Japanese port for adjudication, she "should
have been captured in the usual way." What he means by "the
usual way" it is difficult to know. From the context it would
seem that he means that the officers and mariners of the Japan-
ese man-of-war ought to have put the Chinese officers and
soldiers under chains. But he ought to remember that the crew
of the Japanese man-of-war did not at most exceed four hundred,
whereas the Kowshing carried nearly twelve hundred armed offi-
cers and soldiers. He also thinks it absurd that a man-of-war could
not have taken possession ot a transport without blowing her out of
the water. This sort of argument is, to say the least, mislead-
ing. It proceeds on the assumption that a man-of-war is supe-
rior in strength to a transport, and also on the assumption that
the opposite party is sufficiently intelligent to know this supe-
riority and wherein it consists. Now, it is a fact beyond all ques-
tion, as appears from the official reports" elsewhere appended,
that the Chinese on board the Kowshing were absolutely ignorant
as to the superior strength of the man-of-war over the transport,
and repeatedly declared to the captain and other officers of the
Kowszing that they were ready to fight with the Japanese. It is
very probable that Mr. Gover based his argument upon the false
assumption that those Chinese were as intelligent a set of men
as himself. Hence, his argument fails. The foregoing quota-
tion from no less a source than the editor of the Department of
International Law of a leading English law review, shows how
easy it is for one to have Reason overpowered by Sentiment. It
has been seen elsewhere that the Kowsling" was a part of a fleet
of ten transports," carrying in all an extraordinarily large
number of troops from China to Korea, and was herself actually
carrying about twelve hundred Chinese soldiers. The next
question of international law, therefore, is:
Did the Japanese Commander act within the rules of Interna-
tional Law in destroying a neutral vessel in the transport service
of the enemy and forming a part of his hostile expedition?
Authorities.-Woolsey says that "the conveyance of troops
for a belligerent has long been regarded as highly criminal,"
and mentions many treaties in which exceptions are made
21 Appendix A., NTos. i and 2.
12 Chief Officer Tamplin's Report.
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against free ships when they carry military persons. He says
troops "are something more than contraband, as connecting the
neutral more closely with the enemy," and reasons that if the
obligations of neutrality forbid the conveyance of contraband
goods to the enemy, still more do they forbid the neutral to
forward the enemy's troops. For " a contraband trade may be
only a continuation of one which was legitimate in peace, but it
will rarely happen that a neutral undertakes in time of peace to
send troops of war to another nation." As showing the rigor of
the English courts on this subject, he cites a modem case, in
which a Bremen ship was condemned during the Crimean Law,
by a prize court at Hong Kong, for carrying two hundred and
seventy ship-wrecked Russian officers and seamen from a Japan-
ese to a Russian port.
Phillimore is no less clear than Woolsey, as appears from the
following: "As to the carrying of military persons in the
employ of a belligerent, or being in any way engaged in his
transport service, it has been most solemnly decided by the Tri-
bunals of International Law, both in England and the United
States of North America, that these are acts of hostility on the
part of the neutral which subject the vehicle in which the per-
sons are conveyed to confiscation at the hands of the belligerent.
* * * It has been justly holden that a ship so employed can-
not escape confiscation by alleging that she acted under duress
and violence. If an act of force, exercised by one belligerent
power on a neutral ship or person, were to be deemed as suffi-
cient justification for any act done by him contrary to the known
duties of a neutral character, the rights of the belligerent and
the rules of international law would be easily evaded and set at
naught. The neutral must look to his own Government for
redress against the Government which has coerced him. More-
over, the penal liability of the ship so employed is not extin-
guished until the vessel has shaken off the belligerent character
which her occupation has impressed upon her. So long as she
continues under the command of the enemy she remains liable to
capture and condemnation."
Wheaton evidently does not wish to say what his countryman
Woolsey plainly says, that military persons are something more
than contraband articles. He admits, however, that they are
analogous to contraband goods, and expresses himself thus: "A
neutral vessel which is used as a transport for the enemy's
forces is subject to confiscation, if captured- by the opposite
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belligerent. Nor will the fact of her having been impressed by
violence into the enemy's service, exempt her."
13
Hall, in his usual cautious, yet luminous, style, says: "A
neutral vessel becomes liable to the penalty appropriate to the
carriage of persons in the service of a belligerent, either when
the latter has so hired it that it has become a transport in his
service and that he has entire control over it, or when the per-
sons on board are such in number, importance, or distinction,
and at the same time the circumstances of their reception are
such as to create a reasonable presumption that the owner or his
agent intend to aid the belligerent in his war." Opinions to the
same effect might be added almost indefinitely, but enough have
been quoted to show that there is a remarkable unanimity
among the authorities in holding that a neutral vessel cannot
enter the transport service of one belligerent without at the
same time making herself liable to the other. Nor are these
opinions unsupported by adjudged cases. It is now proposed to
examine these cases.
Adjudications:
The Eliva Anne was the case of an American ship laden with
hemp, iron, and other articles, seized by the English within the
territorial jurisdiction of Sweden, upon the outbreak of the war
of ii2, and brought in for adjudication in the High Court of
Admiralty of England. Among other things, the Court said:
"The high privileges of a neutral are forfeited by the abandon-
ment of that perfect indifference between the contending parties
in which the essence of neutrality consists. * * * A war
may exist without declaration on either side. "1'
The Orozembo was an American ship ostensibly chartered by
a merchant in Lisbon (a neutral port) to proceed to Macao (also
a neutral port), carrying on board three officers of distinction in
the Dutch army, whose real intention was to reach Batavia (a
Dutch colony). The claimant contended that with respect to
the secret destination and intention of particular persons on
board, in the character of passengers, it was impossible for the
master to conjecture, much less to know, the purposes for which
they were going, beyond what they might think proper to dis-
close, that the ship's undertaking was a transaction of a com-
mercial nature in its principal features; that the military per-
sons were few in number, not taken on board in their military
character, and destined, on this immediate voyage, to a neutral
13Wheaton's International Law.
14 1 Dodson's Admiralty Rep. 247.
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country. But the court held: That a vessel hired by the enemy
for the conveyance of military persons is to be considered as a
transport, subject to condemnation; that number alone is an
insignificant circumstance in the considerations on which the
principle of law on this subject is built, since fewer persons of
high quality and character may be of more importance than a
much greater number of persons of lower condition, and that
the master's ignorance of the character of the service on which
he was engaged could afford no ground of exculpation in favor
of the owner."
The Friendship was an American vessel apparently engaged in
commerce, carrying thirty tons of fustic and forty-four hundred
and fourteen hogsheads staves, but also carrying ninety passengers
who were French mariners. After stating the suspicious cir-
cumstances of the case the English High Court of Admiralty
said: "Under these circumstances I [Sir W. Scott] am of opin-
ion, that this vessel is to be considered as a French transport.
* * * What are arms and ammunition in comparison with
men, who may be going to be conveyed, perhaps, to renew their
activity on our shores? They are persons in a military capacity,
who could not have made their escape in a vessel of their own
country. Can it be allowed that neutral vessels shall be at lib-
erty to step in and make themselves a vehicle for the liberation
of such persons, whom the chance of war has made, in some
measure, prisoners in a distant part of their own colonies in the
West Indies? * * * I do with perfect satisfaction of mind,
pronounce this to be a case of a ship engaged in a cause of trade,
which cannot be considered to be permitted to neutral vessels,
and without hesitation, pronounce this vessel subject to condem-
nation. ""
The Carolina was a Swedish ship, which had served in the
French expedition to Alexandria, as a transport to convey
French troops. At the taking of Alexandria by the English this
vessel was captured, but, before she had been brought to adjudi-
cation and while in the possession of the captors, she was lost.
The case was heard in the English High Court of Admiralty, on
a petition by the master that the captors be made answerable to
him for the loss. It was contended on his part that he was an
involuntary agent in the transaction, the French having com-
pelled him, under an act of duress, to submit the vessel to their
service. On this point the Court said: "If an act of force,
15 The Orozembo, 6 Robinson's Admiralty Report 433.
16The Friendship, 6 Rob. 422.
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exercised by one belligerent on a neutral ship or person, is to be
deemed a sufficient justification for any act done by him, con-
trary to the known duties of the neutral character, there would
be an end of any prohibition under the law of nations to carry
contraband, or to engage in any other hostile act. If any loss
is sustained in such a service, the neutral yielding to such
demand must seek redress against the Government that imposed
the restraint upon him. * * * Whether the troops were
received on board voluntarily or involuntarily could make no
difference. "'
It was also contended on the master's part that it was an
additional circumstance to be urged against the captors, as a
reason why the loss should fall on them, that they stripped the
vessel of her crew, and put other hands on board, and did not
proceed to bring the vessel to adjudication immediately. On
this point the Court said: "It must be conceded that com-
manders acting in the management of great expeditions cannot
be tied down exactly to the same rules, by which individual
cruisers are directed to proceed. "1 The principles set forth in
the foregoing cases have been adopted by the Supreme Court of
the United States, in many cases.
In the case of the Commercen, a Swedish vessel, captured by
an American armed schooner, Mr. Justice Story said: "It has
been solemnly adjudged that being engaged in the transport
service of the enemy, or in the conveyance of military persons in
his employ, are acts of hostility which subject the property to
confiscation. * * * The principle of these determinations
was asserted to be that the party must be deemed to place him-
self in the service of the hostile state, and assist in warding off
the pressure of the war, or in favoring its offensive projects."
In the case of The Nereide, a neutral vessel carrying enemy's
cargo and sailing under neutral convoy, Mr. Justice Story said:
"It is a clear maxim of international law that a neutral is bound to
a perfect impartiality as to all the belligerents. If he incorporates
himself into the measure or policy of either, if he become auxil-
iary to the enterprises or acts of either, he forfeits his neutral
character. * * * The act of sailing under belligerent or neu-
tral convoy is of itself a violation of neutrality, and the ship and
cargo if caught in delicto are justly confiscable, etc., etc."
The foregoing examination of the opinions of the most emi-
1 The Carolina, 4 Rob. 256.
IsThe Carolina. 4 Rob. 256.
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nent publicists and also of regularly adjudged cases, establishes
the following:
That a neutral who would claim the benefit of his neutral
character must act with perfect impartiality toward both the
belligerent parties; that the conveyance of a certain class of
articles for the benefit of one belligerent is such an offense as to
forfeit his neutral character; that .it is a much more serious
offense, nay, "a highly criminal" conduct, for a neutral to
engage in the transportation of troops; that if caught in the act,
it is of no avail to the neutral to plead that he was acting under
duress or was ignorant of the purpose of the belligerent whom he
was serving; that if a neutral vessel, caught in the act of such
hostile service, is lost while in the possession of the captors, the
owner of such vessel can obtain no relief from the belligerezt
whom he has been wrongingg; that this is so even where it can be
charged against the captors that they did not proceed to adjudi-
cation immediately; that this rule is founded upon the ground
that the commander of a fleet has the discretionary power to
decide for himself whether he shall attend to the interest of a
wrongful neutral vessel first or postpone it till the greater inter-
est of his own fleet has been attended to.
Applying these principles to the case under consideration, it
cannot be denied that the Kowshing was a neutral vessel that had
forfeited all her neutral rights by having acted contrary to the
fundamental rules of the Law of Nations. She was a neutral
vessel identified with the enemy, and as such she was no more
entitled to protection than an enemy's vessel. If she had been
caught singly while engaged in the ordinary duties of a trans-
port, she could and should have been brought in for adjudica-
tion by a Japanese Court of Prizes. Even in that case, however,
the Japanese commander would not have been bound to have
brought her in immediately, but he could have attended to his
more important duties. If, in the meantime, the vessel, after
being stripped of its crew, should have been lost, the Japanese
commander would not have been liable to the owner for the
loss. If, as was the fact, the Kowshing was a part of a hostile
expedition, her flying the British flag could have made no differ-
ence and the Japanese were entitled to prevent her by all means
from reaching her destination. If, as was the fact, the number
of Chinese soldiers on board was such as to greatly outnumber
the Japanese; if, as was the fact, the Chinese soldiers on board
of her were such an ignorant set of men as not to believe,
though told, that, however large their own number, the mechan-
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ical superiority of a man-of-war over an unarmed transport was
such, that they were completely in the hands of the Japanese,
and if, as was the fact, owing to these circumstances, it was abso-
lutely impossible for the Japanese commander to prevent these
Chinese from reaching their- destination (to the great disad-
vantage and perhaps utter defeat of the Japanese in Korea)
without destroying a vessel, which, by reason of having acted
contrary to the Law of Nations, had made itself confiscable to
the Japanese; it cannot be denied that the Japanese commander
was acting within the rules of international law, when he threat-
ened the Kowshing with destruction in case of disobedience to his
orders and did destroy her in consequence of such disobedience.
It is alleged that at the time of her leaving port the Kowshing
was without notice. But, was she not chartered by a military
commission of the Chinese Government and placed under its sole
control? Do not the reports of her master and chief officer
show that they knew that she was a part of a fleet of ten vessels,
chartered by the Chinese Government for the purpose of convey-
ing reinforcements to the Chinese forces in Korea? Was she
not caught in the very act of carrying a part of these reinforce-
ments? In the face of these circumstances, can it be said that
she was without any notice whatever? It may be contended that
these circumstances merely constituted a case of presumptive
notice. Be it as it may, at any rate the Kowshing had actual
notice of the existence of a war, from the moment when she
received the orders of the Japanese commander. If after receiv-
ing such orders accompanied by a due warning, she did not
obey them, it can not be complained that the Japanese com-
mander did execute his orders by means of force, the only alter-
native possible under the circumstances. It is also alleged that
in disobeying the orders of the Japanese commander the officers
of the Kowsling were acting under duress of the Chinese gene-
rals on board, but that such defenses do not avail in case of this
kind has too often been decided to need any discussion at this
point (The Carolina, ante.).
In conclusion the author ventures to hope, that, imperfect as
this inquiry has been, the intrinsic nature of the case is such
that he has not been altogether unsuccessful in showing that the
many charges made against the so-called "Japanese barbarities, "
"ignorance of International Law," etc., etc., were, in this case,
as in other cases, utterly without foundation. He may also be
pardoned to hope that the Kowshing incident may serve in the-
future as a warning to that class of European adventurers who
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have heretofore been in the habit of thinking that with the Ori-
entals they may deal as they please simply because the guns of
their nations will always protect them!
7okichi Masao.
NoTE. -For lack of space the reports of the master and chief officer of the
Kowshing and the nine official documents which passed between Japan and
China, referred to in this thesis, have been omitted. Those who may wish to
consult these will find them in the October Numbers of the Japan Mail,
[Yokohama, 1894], and also in the Appendices of Vladimir's "Japan-China
War."-Ed.
